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CoRPORATIONs-SHAREHOLDERs-lliGHT To BRING DERIVATIVE ACTION FoR 
TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER .ANrrrnusT LAws-Plaintiff, owner of 50 percent of 
the stock in a theater corporation, brought a derivative action in federal court 
for treble damages for loss of profits allegedly suffered from defendant's violation 
of the antitrust laws. The district court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, held, reversed and remanded. Under the 
new federal rules,1 a stockholder may bring a derivative action for treble damages 
under the antitrust laws.2 Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures~ Inc., 
(2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 731. 
1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1946) following §723c, Act of June 
19, 1934. 
2 Plaintiff here was suing under the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 
(1946) §15. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 
shareholders were frustrated in their attempts to bring derivative actions on 
behalf of recalcitrant corporations for damages suffered from antitrust law viola-
tions. The difficulty stemmed from the fact that, while the derivative suit is 
a creation of equity,3 the statutory treble damage action is a law action requiring 
determination of the facts by a jury.4 In two old Supreme Court cases, Fleit-
mann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co.5 and United Copper Securities Co. v. 
Amalgamated Copper Co., 6 stockholders were successively denied the right to 
bring such a derivative action, first in an equity case and then in a law action. 
The principal case is the first one of its type to arise since the enactment of the 
federal rules. The fundamental purpose of the new rules, as summed up in 
rule 2, 7 is the elimination of the procedural distinction between law and equity 
actions. 8 Hence it was a simple matter for the court of appeals to permit 
what is in effect joinder of two actions-the equitable question of the right of 
the stockholder to bring the action, and the legal damage action under the 
Clayton Act. Although the statutory right to jury trial was waived in this 
case, the court stated9 what would seem apparent, that a district court can bring 
in a jury to decide the fact issues relating to treble damage liability after it has 
disposed of matters relating to the stockholder's right to sue. The district 
court's decision10 to deny the right to sue was based on the conclusion that 
rule 2 has not changed the doctrines of the Fleitmann and United Copper cases. 
The court simply stated that these were rules of substance which remained 
unaltered by the procedural merger effected by rule 2.11 While it is true that 
the new rules were not intended to obliterate all distinctions between law and 
equity rules, merger was intended to be allowed to the extent that it does not 
constrict the traditional flexibility of equity doctrine.12 It is submitted that the 
court of appeals was correct in concluding that the proposed merger offers no 
threat to the flexibility of equity, since in effect the two issues, stockholder's 
right and defendant's liability, are tried separately. Furthermore, the rule laid 
down by the principal case is useful in rounding out the treble-damage action 
8 Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 
828 (1947); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 
37 S.Ct. 509 (1917). See 13 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §5944 (1942); Glenn, "The Stock-
holder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances," 33 YALE L.J. 580 (1924). 
4Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 36 S.Ct. 233 (1916); 
Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, (2d Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 426. 
5 Note 4 supra. 
6 Note 3 supra. 
7 "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " 
s 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §2.06 (1948); Holtzoff, ''Equitable and Legal Rights 
and Remedies under the New Federal Procedure," 31 CALIP. L. RBv. 127 (1943). 
9 Principal case at 735. 
10 Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 107 F. 
Supp. 532. The district court opinion is criticized in a note, 52 CoL. L. RBv. 1069 (1952), 
which was cited by the court of appeals in reversing. 
11 District court opinion, note 10 supra, at 541. 
12 See Judge Frank's discussion of this point in Bereslavsky v. Caffey, (2d Cir. 1947) 
161 F. (2d) 499 at 500. 
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as an effective method of curbing antitrust law violation. It is particularly 
helpful in cases such as this one where the antitrust law violator is the prin-
cipal obstacle to direct action by the corporation itself. 
William K. Davenport, S.Ed. 
